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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 This case concerns Plaintiff-Appellant Ra-King Allen’s 
attempt to sue for malicious prosecution after the State of New 
Jersey declined to retry him for possession with intent to 
distribute heroin.  We must decide whether the District Court 
erred in granting summary judgment on the malicious 
prosecution claim because: (1) Ra-King Allen’s underlying 
prosecution for possession with intent to distribute heroin did 
3 
 
not terminate in his favor; and (2) the State of New Jersey has 
not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.  For the reasons 
stated below, we will affirm.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 This case resulted from a vehicle stop and arrest that 
took place in 2008.  On April 21, 2008, New Jersey State Police 
Trooper M. DiLillo stopped a rented Chevy Malibu for speeding 
on Route 80 West in New Jersey.  Plaintiff-Appellant Ra-King 
Allen was the only passenger.  His uncle, Andrew Allen, was 
the driver.   
 When DiLillo approached the vehicle, Andrew Allen 
informed him that his nephew, Ra-King, had rented the vehicle 
and that they were traveling from New York City to 
Binghamton, New York.  DiLillo performed a record check and 
discovered that Andrew Allen had an outstanding warrant.  He 
placed Andrew Allen under arrest and, after conducting a search 
of his person, placed him in the rear of his police vehicle.  
DiLillo then asked Ra-King Allen for his license.  He 
discovered that Ra-King Allen too had an outstanding warrant 
for failure to appear.  DiLillo then placed him under arrest.  
During DiLillo’s search incident to the arrest, Ra-King Allen 
admitted that he had marijuana on his person.  DiLillo 
discovered two small baggies of marijuana in Ra-King Allen’s 
shoe.  
 DiLillo had radioed for assistance with the stop.  
Defendant-Appellee Trooper Richard Nugnes (“Nugnes”) went 
to the scene.  When Nugnes arrived, DiLillo had already put 
both Andrew and Ra-King Allen into custody.  At that point, 
DiLillo left the scene with the two men.  Nugnes remained to 
wait for a tow truck to remove the impounded Chevy Malibu.   
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 When the tow truck arrived, the driver attempted to 
unlock the car.  In the course of doing so, he accidentally opened 
the trunk.  At that point, Nugnes turned and looked at the trunk.  
He told the tow truck driver not to do anything.  Nugnes pulled 
out a “thing wrapped up in a black plastic bag.”  JA63.  Based 
on his training and experience, Nugnes believed that it was a 
bundle of heroin.  He radioed in to inform the police station that 
he had found narcotics and then searched the rest of the trunk.  
The plastic bag did contain heroin.   
 Ra-King Allen (hereinafter referred to as “Allen”) was 
charged with: (1) manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing 
heroin; (2) possession, use or being under the influence, or 
failure to make lawful disposition of a controlled dangerous 
substance; (3) possession of under 50 grams of marijuana; and 
(4) possession of narcotic paraphernalia.  Allen moved to 
suppress the heroin, but the trial court denied the motion on the 
ground that the evidence was in plain view.  Allen then pled 
guilty to possession with intent to distribute heroin and 
possession of marijuana.  With respect to the heroin charge, 
Allen admitted on the record that: “I had in my car on April 
21st, there was heroin in the trunk of my car, and I had 
knowledge of it.”  JA120.  When questioned by the judge, Allen 
affirmed that he knew the drug was heroin and that he intended 
to distribute it.  Allen was sentenced to fourteen years’ 
imprisonment with 57 months of parole ineligibility.   
 The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the 
motion to suppress.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 
however, remanded to the trial court for additional fact-finding.  
On remand, the trial court heard testimony from the tow truck 
driver and Nugnes.  Based on that testimony, the trial court was 
“not persuaded, by even the preponderance of the evidence, that 
the mannitol or the heroin was visible prior to the trooper’s 
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incursion into the trunk.”  JA142.  Having retained jurisdiction, 
the Supreme Court of New Jersey then reversed and vacated 
Allen’s conviction on the heroin charge on the ground that 
“[n]either the automobile exception nor the plain view 
exception” applied to justify Nugnes’s warrantless search of the 
vehicle.  JA136.   
 The State moved to dismiss the indictment because it 
would be “unable to proceed to trial” as a result of “th[e] Order 
[vacating Allen’s conviction] and the suppression of the 
evidence which corresponds” to the indictment.  JA21.  The trial 
court granted the State’s motion.   
 Allen then filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against 
Defendants-Appellees the New Jersey State Police (the 
“NJSP”), Joseph R. Fuentes, the Superintendent of the New 
Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety-Division of State 
Police (“Fuentes”), and Nugnes (collectively, hereinafter 
“Defendants”).  The District Court dismissed his first 
Complaint.  Ultimately, Allen’s operative Second Amended 
Complaint alleged that (1) Defendants committed malicious 
prosecution in violation of § 1983 and New Jersey common law 
and (2) Defendants Fuentes and the NJSP violated his 
constitutional rights under § 1983 by adopting and 
implementing careless and reckless policies and failing to 
adequately train and supervise Nugnes.1  Defendants filed a new 
motion to dismiss, which the District Court denied.  Defendants 
 
1 Allen has made no reference to this claim in his 
briefing on appeal.  We therefore will not reach this claim, as 
it is waived.  See, e.g., United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 
222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an appellant’s failure 
to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes 
waiver of that issue on appeal.”).  
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then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the District 
Court granted.   
 This timely appeal followed.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over Allen’s § 1983 
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction over Allen’s 
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We conduct a plenary review 
of the grant of summary judgment.  Goldenstein v. Repossessors 
Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).  Summary judgment 
should only be granted where the record shows that “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
We draw all reasonable inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.  
Goldenstein, 815 F.3d at 146.  
III. DISCUSSION 
 At issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in 
granting summary judgment to Defendants on Allen’s 
malicious prosecution claim.  The District Court granted 
summary judgment for two reasons: (1) the termination of 
Allen’s criminal case did not indicate that he was innocent of 
the crime charged; and (2) New Jersey has not waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit for damages in 
federal court.  Allen argues that the District Court erred on both 
counts.  We disagree.    
A. Allen’s Prosecution Did Not Terminate in His Favor 
 To prove a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a 
plaintiff must show that:  
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(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding; 
(2) the criminal proceeding ended in his favor; 
(3) the defendant initiated the proceeding 
without probable cause; (4) the defendant acted 
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing 
the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff 
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with 
the concept of seizure as a consequence of a legal 
proceeding.  
Johnson v. Knorr, 477 F.3d 75, 81–82 (3d Cir. 2007).  At issue 
in this case is the second requirement, the favorable termination 
element.  New Jersey common law likewise requires the 
plaintiff to show that the underlying criminal action “was 
terminated favorably to the plaintiff.”  Lind v. Schmid, 337 A.2d 
365, 368 (N.J. 1975). 
 The favorable termination element is only satisfied if 
the criminal case was “disposed of in a way that indicates the 
innocence of the accused.”  Kossler v. Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181, 
187 (3d Cir. 2009).  “The purpose of the favorable termination 
requirement is to avoid ‘the possibility of the claimant 
succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the 
underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong 
judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting 
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.’”  Id. 
(alteration omitted) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 
484 (1994)).  Depending on the facts, a plaintiff may be able to 
satisfy the favorable termination if he shows that his criminal 
proceeding was terminated by: 




(b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or 
(c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings 
by the public prosecutor, or 
(d) the quashing of an indictment or information, 
or 
(e) an acquittal, or 
(f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial 
or appellate court. 
Id. (citation omitted).  
 Allen submits that he has satisfied the favorable 
termination element because the State formally abandoned his 
prosecution.  Although in some cases a prosecutor’s decision to 
abandon the criminal case may indicate the innocence of the 
accused, and thereby satisfies the favorable termination 
requirement, this analysis depends on the particular facts.  As 
we held in Donahue v. Gavin, 280 F.3d 371 (3d Cir. 2002), “not 
all cases where the prosecutor abandons criminal charges are 
considered to have terminated favorably.”  Id. at 383.  
Abandonment of the criminal case is a favorable termination 
“only when [the case’s] final disposition is such as to indicate 
the innocence of the accused.”  Id. (emphasis omitted).  For that 
reason, in Donahue, we held that a prosecutor’s decision not to 
retry a defendant in the interest of judicial economy, and not 
because of any doubt about the strength of the evidence against 
him, was not a favorable termination.  Id. at 384.   
 Although we have not considered whether a 
prosecutor’s decision to abandon further prosecution due to 
suppression of otherwise reliable evidence is a favorable 
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termination, our sister circuits have done so.  We agree with 
their reasoning: 
[I]f the circumstances show that unreliable 
evidence has been suppressed and the 
prosecution then abandons the case because of 
lack of sufficient reliable evidence, that would be 
a circumstance where the dismissal is indicative 
of innocence.  But if the evidence was only 
suppressed on “technical” grounds having no or 
little relation to the evidence’s trustworthiness, 
then the fact that there was not other sufficient 
evidence would not be indicative of innocence. 
Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 804 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Margheim v. 
Buljko, 855 F.3d 1077, 1089 (10th Cir. 2017); Mills v. City of 
Covina, 921 F.3d 1161, 1171 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
dismissal of a criminal case because evidence was suppressed 
under the exclusionary rule is not a favorable termination for 
malicious prosecution).   
 The question is thus whether the evidence was 
suppressed because it was unreliable or whether it was 
suppressed based on other grounds that do not cast doubt on the 
trustworthiness of the evidence.  We must therefore “look to the 
stated reasons for the dismissal [of the criminal proceedings] as 
well as the circumstances surrounding it in an attempt to 
determine whether the dismissal indicates [the plaintiff’s] 
innocence.”  M.G. v. Young, 826 F.3d 1259, 1263 (10th Cir. 




 Here, the Supreme Court of New Jersey vacated Allen’s 
conviction because Nugnes’s search of the vehicle’s trunk was 
not permitted under any exception to the warrant requirement.  
In other words, the search was conducted and the inculpatory 
evidence was discovered in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court cast any doubt at 
any point on the reliability of the heroin discovered during the 
search or its relevance to the charges for which Allen was 
convicted; the issue was solely whether the search itself was 
constitutionally permitted.  The evidence was thus ultimately 
suppressed for reasons “having no or little relation to the 
evidence’s trustworthiness,” Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 804, and 
Allen has not shown otherwise.   
 Allen’s claim that the termination of his criminal case 
was indicative of his innocence because he was arrested without 
probable cause is unavailing.  This argument conflates the 
second and third elements of the requirements for a malicious 
prosecution claim.  To prove a malicious prosecution claim, 
Allen must show both that the criminal proceeding ended in his 
favor and that the defendant initiated the proceeding without 
probable cause.  See Johnson, 477 F.3d at 81–82.  Allen’s 
ultimate success in his suppression motion may bear on the 
probable cause element.  However, since the suppression did 
not cast any doubt on the reliability of the evidence, it does not 
indicate his innocence.   
 The State has not suggested that it decided not to retry 
Allen because he was innocent.  To the contrary, Allen admitted 
under oath that he was guilty of possession with intent to 
distribute heroin.  Specifically, he stated: “I had in my car on 
April 21st, there was heroin in the trunk of my car, and I had 
knowledge of it.”  JA 120.  Allen never claimed innocence in 
his criminal proceeding or sought to withdraw his plea.  See 
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State v. Taccetta, 975 A.2d 928, 935 (N.J. 2009) (“The notion 
that a defendant can enter a plea of guilty, while maintaining his 
innocence, is foreign to our state jurisprudence.  Court-
sanctioned perjury is not a permissible basis for the entry of a 
plea in this State.”) (internal footnote omitted).  
 In the context of this lawsuit, Allen now claims that he 
was innocent.  During his deposition, Allen testified that he did 
not know that heroin was in the trunk of the vehicle.  But in light 
of his previous, in-court, sworn admission of his guilt, no 
rational juror could have credited this new assertion of 
innocence.  “[I]f the nonmoving party’s evidence, when viewed 
in the context of all of the evidence, could not be credited by a 
rational juror, summary judgment may be granted.”  United 
States v. 717 S. Woodward St., 2 F.3d 529, 533 (3d Cir. 1993).  
The District Court therefore did not err in granting summary 
judgment on the ground that Allen failed to meet the 
requirements of a malicious prosecution claim because he failed 
to show that his criminal case was terminated in a way 
indicative of his innocence.   
B. New Jersey Has Not Waived its Eleventh Amendment 
Immunity 
 The District Court also granted summary judgment to 
Defendants NJSP and Superintendent Fuentes on the ground 
that New Jersey has not waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity from suit.  We agree. 
 The Eleventh Amendment provides: “The Judicial 
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to 
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign State.”  U.S. Const. amend. XI.  The 
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Eleventh Amendment “bar[s] all private suits against non-
consenting States in federal court,” Lombardo v. Pa., Dep’t of 
Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008), with the goal 
of protecting “the States’ solvency and dignity,” Hess v. Port 
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994); see also 
Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 83 (3d Cir. 
2016) (“[The Eleventh Amendment] has evolved into a potent 
tool for States to ensure that States retain their sovereignty and 
integrity as constituent polities of our national government.”).  
The Amendment “has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to 
shield States and certain State-affiliated entities from suits for 
damages in federal court.”  Bradley v. W. Chester Univ. of Pa. 
State Sys. of Higher Educ., 880 F.3d 643, 654 (3d Cir. 2018).  
There is no exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for 
plaintiffs who bring state law claims against a state.  See 
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 
(1984) (recognizing that Eleventh Amendment immunity 
applies to state law claims in addition to federal claims). 
 A state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
thereby permitting suit against it in federal court.  To do so, 
“[t]he state either must voluntarily invoke our jurisdiction by 
bringing suit . . . or must make a clear declaration that it intends 
to submit itself to our jurisdiction.”  MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. 
Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 504 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Waiver of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity will be found “only where the state’s consent is stated 
by the most express language or by such overwhelming 
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other 
reasonable construction.”  M.A. ex rel. E.S. v. State-Operated 
Sch. Dist. of City of Newark, 344 F.3d 335, 345 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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 New Jersey has not done so.  See Port Auth. Police 
Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 819 F.2d 
413, 418 (3d Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Hess, 
513 U.S. 30.  Allen claims that the State waived its immunity 
under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act “in cases in which a 
public official has engaged in a crime, actual fraud, actual 
malice or willful misconduct” and “for public entities, when an 
injury is proximately caused by an ‘act or omission of a public 
employee within the scope of his employment.’” Appellant Br. 
26 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-2).  However, the New Jersey 
Tort Claims Act does not constitute waiver of immunity from 
suit in federal court; the statute reflects a limited waiver only of 
the State’s immunity from suit in state court.  See Velez v. City 
of Jersey City, 850 A.2d 1238, 1241–42 (N.J. 2004).  “[A] 
State’s waiver of sovereign immunity in its own courts is not a 
waiver of the Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal 
courts.”  Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 99 n.9.  
Allen has not pointed to any section of the New Jersey Tort 
Claims Act, or any other statute, in which New Jersey has made 
a “clear declaration” that it consents to the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts for suits seeking damages.  MCI, 271 F.3d at 504.  
 The only remaining question is thus whether the NJSP 
and its Superintendent, Fuentes, are entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity as “arm[s] of the State.”  Bradley, 880 
F.3d at 654.  We answer in the affirmative.  To determine 
whether a state-affiliated entity is entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity, we apply a three part test, also referred 
to as the “Fitchik factors”: “(1) whether the money that would 
pay any judgment would come from the state; (2) the status of 
the agency under state law; and (3) the degree of autonomy 
possessed by the agency.”  Id. at 654–55 (citing Fitchik v. N.J. 
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Transit Rail Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655 (3d Cir. 1989) (en 
banc)). 
 Appropriately, Allen does not dispute that the NJSP is a 
state agency entitled to immunity.  The NJSP is a division of 
New Jersey’s Department of Law and Public Safety, which is 
an executive department.   N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 52:17B-1; 
52:17B-3.  It is organized under the authority of the State’s 
Attorney General.  Id. § 52:17B-3.  The Superintendent of the 
NJSP is appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent 
of the Senate and serves during the term of the Governor who 
appointed him or her.  Id. § 53:1-2.  The purpose of the 
Department is “to provide for the enforcement of the criminal 
law of the State” and to render “legal services to the Governor 
and to all officers, departments, boards, bodies, commissions 
and instrumentalities of the State Government.”  Id. § 52:17A-
1.  These are indisputably government services.  Further, the 
NJSP is funded by appropriations made from the New Jersey 
State Treasury.  See Anticipated Resources for the Fiscal Year 
2019-2020, P.L.2019, Ch. 150, approved June 30, 2019, Senate, 
No. 2020, 
https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2018/Bills/AL19/150_.PDF.  
Payment of a judgment against the NJSP arising out of tort 
comes from the State Treasury under New Jersey Statutes 
Annotated § 59:12-1.  The NJSP is thus deeply integrated into 
the government and governmental functions of New Jersey.  As 
such, it is a state agency entitled to Eleventh Amendment 
immunity.  See, e.g., Longoria v. New Jersey, 168 F. Supp. 2d 
308, 315–16 (D.N.J. 2008) (deciding that the NJSP “is plainly 
an arm of the State of New Jersey” based on the Fitchik factors). 
 The same conclusion applies to Allen’s suit against 
Fuentes in his official capacity as Superintendent of the NJSP.  
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“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is 
not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the 
official’s office.  As such, it is no different from a suit against 
the State itself.”  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted).  We will therefore 
affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Allen’s claims against 
the NJSP and Fuentes based on New Jersey’s Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.  
